Домашнее задание .

Strategic Challenge

Russian President Vladimir Putin (describe) the collapse of the Soviet Union as the (great) (geopolitics) catastrophe in history. Though it may not be true of all of history, it is (certain) true of modern Russian history, because it cost Russia what it needs most: (strategy) (deep). Until 1989, Russia’s (west) border (be) (effect) in (centre) Germany. The Caucasus shielded Russia from the south. Central Asia was a vast buffer against South Asia and (potential) China. In other words, the Russian heartland was secure from every (direct).

The fall of the Soviet Union pulled its (west) border back behind the Baltics, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia retained the North Caucasus but lost the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. (Centre) Asia broke down into (depend) states. This (contract) of Russia represented not only a diminution of size but a (decrease) distance between (potent) enemies.

Russia (inevitable) (seek) to (draw) the borders before a serious threat emerged. That no serious threat existed gave Russia some time. But for a country like Russia, (secure) can manifest (quick). Germany went from (be) a (nation) wreck to an (exist) threat in (little) than a decade. The (Russia) had to increase their (strategy) (deep), but they had to do so without (trigger) the attack they feared before their (deep) (increase).

We (see) three events in recent months – one in Belarus, one in the South Caucasus, one in Kyrgyzstan – that together encompass portions of the borderlands Russia (lose). To be clear, it is always possible to see three (connect) events (connect) by logic, and to assume that this logic has anything to do with Russia’s (strategy) problem.

In Belarus, a key buffer on the North European Plain, longtime President Alexander Lukashenko (elect) in what many describe as an (legitimate) (elect) in August. Protests against the results (go on) (much) or (little) ever since. Russia’s (relate) with Lukashenko is (complicate) – he tries to balance between Russia and the West when he can – but Lukashenko could (hard) (describe) as (west). He and Moscow have their (differ), but Moscow always (be) very (influence) in Minsk and thus always (have) an (perfect) (solve) to its (strategy) dilemma to the west. If Lukashenko (replace) with someone more (antagonist) toward Russia or more (sympathy) to the West, it could (effect) move NATO, Poland and the Americans (far) east, (relegate) cities such as Smolensk to border towns.

In Kyrgyzstan, which sits between Russia and China, there is similar (politics) unrest. Here, too, an (elect) (result) in claims of fraud and large-scale (demonstrate). The (Russia) have some military facilities there, but the (important) point is that it provides a buffer between Russia and China. Russia and China are not (current) at odds, but they fought each other as (recent) as the 1960s. Though that was 60 years ago, geopolitics tends to repeat (it), and whatever current interests might guide them, both are old hands at the shifts of history, and neither wants the other to have an advantage. It’s (clear) whether the (Belarus) playbook will work here, but Moscow has a stake in what happens, and (give) the (likely) that an arbiter (need), (involve) would not be (surprise).

In the South Caucasus, a war (break out) between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a (dispute) enclave (govern) by ethnic (Armenia) inside Azerbaijan. (Broad) (speak), Azerbaijan (back) as before by Turkey, a country with whom Azerbaijan has an ethnic affinity, while Armenia (support) by Russia. But the conflict is much (complicate) than that. For one thing, Azerbaijan has important relations with Russia that it cannot afford

to sever. For another, Russian (intelligent) (sure) (be) aware of war (prepare) in Azerbaijan and so (advise) them to back off (give) Moscow’s relations with Armenia. That (not to happen). Last, Russia (note) that the treaty it has with Armenia (not to include) Nagorno-Karabakh and that therefore Moscow has no (oblige) to intervene (military) on Armenia’s side. The Russians (clear) (use) the war to increase their influence with Azerbaijan, the (powerful) and wealthy country in the South Caucasus. Moscow helped to broker a cease-fire, but it (quick) fell apart. Without Russia, Armenia has few options. Georgia, which (invade) by Russia in 2008, won’t be much help, and the United States, which helped Georgia in the (say) war, will likely choose to abstain.

By (appear) to shift their support from Armenia to Azerbaijan or, (precise), (bring) them both into the Russian orbit, the (Russia) solve a vital (strategy) problem. First, it helps to secure the South Caucasus, which is the path (likely) (take) by (potent) (invade). Second, by (increase) control of the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus (make) (secure). Of course, Russia already controls the North Caucasus and maintains a strong line of defense there, but Chechnya and Dagestan are home to militant (Islam) (move), which, as Moscow (claim), (support) by the U.S. through intermediaries from the South Caucasus. True or not, Moscow (take) any chances.

So we see events in Russia’s (west) and (south) frontiers (play out) in such a way that the (geopolitics) catastrophe Putin spoke of (rectify). There are no tanks (rumble) in either direction, but the politics of the situation appear (head) that way. Of course, all of this may be (coincide). But it’s (interest) to note the process that (coincide) or (calculate) seems (put) in motion. But the (Russia) aren’t fools, and with Armenia and Azerbaijan (align) with Russia and Turkey (exclude) from the game, Georgia is (isolate), and a repeat of 2008 would undermine the (subtle) of the Russian move.